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1. Introduction 
This study provides a forward-looking simulation analysis of economy-wide and 
distributional implications associated with alternative pathways for the development of 
the electricity sector in Ghana and Kenya. It is part of a wider research project that 
seeks to identify the binding constraints to economically viable investments in 
renewable energy and to analyse the political feasibility of a transition to a sustainable 
low carbon energy path in the two countries.1  
From an economic perspective, significant shifts in the power mix of an economy as 
well as policy measures to induce or support such shifts are bound to affect the 
structure of domestic prices across the whole economy with repercussions for the 
growth prospects of different production sectors and for the real income growth paths 
of different socio-economics groups. Understanding these economy-wide 
repercussions is crucial for a study concerned with the obstacles to - and political 
feasibility of - adopting a low-carbon growth strategy.  The analysis requires the 
adoption of a multi-sectoral general equilibrium approach that allows to capture the 
input-output linkages between the electricity sector and the rest of the economy as 
well as the linkages between production activity, household income and expenditure 
and government policy.  
Thus, the present study develops purpose-built dynamic computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) models for Ghana and Kenya with a detailed country-specific 
representation of the power sector to simulate the prospective medium-run growth and 
distributional implications associated with a shift towards a higher share of renewables 
in the power mix up to 2025. 
The following section explains the methodological approach and describes the key 
features of the CGE models in a non-technical manner. Each model is calibrated to a 
social accounting matrix (SAM) which reflects the observed input-output structure of 
production, the commodity composition of demand and the pattern of income 
distribution for the country at a disaggregated level at the start of the simulation 
                                                 
1 This report was written for the Green Growth Diagnostics for Africa project funded by the Engineering 
and Physical Sciences Research Council under EPSRC grant EP/L002507/1 
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horizon. Section 3 spells out the data sources for the construction of the social 
accounting matrices and outlines the model calibration process. Sections 4 and 5 
present the results of the dynamic simulation analysis for Kenya and Ghana 
respectively. In each case, we first develop a stylised baseline scenario that simulates 
the evolution of the economy under current power sector expansion plans up to 2025 
and then contrast these baselines with alternative lower carbon energy scenarios. 
Furthermore, the sensitivity of results to alternative projections for world market fossil 
fuel prices is explored. Section 6 draws conclusions. 
2. The Analytic Framework 
2.1. Rationale for the Adoption of a CGE Approach 
Computable general equilibrium (CGE) models – aka applied general equilibrium 
models – are widely used tools in energy and climate mitigation policy analysis. 
Applications range from short-run impact assessments of shocks to the energy system 
for particular countries to global long-run energy system scenario studies with a time 
horizon of multiple decades.2 
The prime appeal of – and need for - adopting a general equilibrium approach to 
energy policy and energy-related environmental policy analysis arises from the fact 
that energy is an input to virtually every economic activity. Hence, changes in the 
energy sector ‘will ripple through multiple markets, with far larger consequences than 
energy’s small share of national income might suggest’ (Sue Wing 2009). The unique 
advantage of the CGE approach over partial equilibrium approaches is its ability to 
incorporate these ‘ripple effects’ in a systematic manner. 
In contrast to partial equilibrium approaches, CGE models consider all sectors in an 
economy simultaneously and take consistent account of economy-wide resource 
constraints, intersectoral intermediate input-output linkages and interactions between 
markets for goods and services on the one hand and primary factor markets including 
labour markets on the other. CGE models simulate the full circular flow of income in 
                                                 
2 For a survey of energy-focused CGE studies up to the mid-1990s see Bhattacharyya (1996). For more 
recent overviews, see Sue Wing (2009) and Kemfert and Truong (2009). For a concise recent survey 
of the small number of CGE studies concerned with a low-carbon energy transition in developing 
countries see Pueyo et al (2015: 52-59). 
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an economy from (i) income generation through productive activity, to (ii) the primary 
distribution of that income to workers, owners of productive capital, and recipients of 
the proceeds from land and other natural resource endowments, to (iii) the 
redistribution of that income through taxes and transfers, and to (iv) the use of that 
income for consumption and investment (Pueyo et al 2015). 
2.2. Specification of the Dynamic CGE Models for Kenya and Ghana 
In terms of theoretical pedigree, the CGE models for Kenya and Ghana employed in 
this study can be characterised as modified dynamic extensions of standard 
comparative-static single-country CGE models for developing countries in the tradition 
of Dervis, de Melo and Robinson (1982), Robinson et al (1999) and Lofgren et al 
(2002). Models belonging to this class have been widely used in applied development 
policy research. Apart from the incorporation of capital accumulation, population 
growth, labor force growth and technical progress, the main difference to the standard 
model is a more sophisticated specification of the electricity sector as detailed below.3 
2.2.1. Domestic Production and Input Demand 
Domestic producers in the model are price takers in output and input markets and 
maximise intra-temporal profits subject to technology constraints. The technologies for 
the transformation of inputs into real outputs are described by sectoral constant-
returns-to scale production functions. In line with common practice in energy-focused 
top-down CGE models, technology specifications belonging to the generic class of 
KLEM (Capital (K), Labour, Energy, Materials) production functions are employed to 
capture substitution possibilities among energy and-non-energy inputs and among 
different energy sources. 4 In technical terms, the sectoral KLEM production functions 
take the form of nested multi-level functions with a (positive or zero) constant elasticity 
of substitution (CES) among inputs grouped together within the same nest. Figure 2.1 
provides a schematic representation of the substitution hierarchy between different 
inputs in production in the model. 
                                                 
3 See e.g. Arndt, Robinson and Willenbockel (2011) and Robinson, Willenbockel and Strzepek (2012) 
for earlier recursive-dynamic extensions of the standard model. 
4 See e.g. Böhringer and Löschel (2004), Böhringer, Löschel and Rutherford (2009), Willenbockel and 
Hoa (2011). For further reference to the literature on energy-focused top-down CGE models, see again 
Pueyo et al (2015: Chapter 6). 
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In each sector, the production of a given output quantity requires non-energy inputs 
and a composite value-added/energy composite in fixed proportions. The value 
added/energy composite requires energy and primary factors (i.e. skilled and unskilled 
labour, capital, land and natural resources) in variable proportions. Thus, when the 
composite price index of energy rises relative to primary factor prices, energy inputs 
are replaced to some extent by additional inputs of primary factors. In other words, the 
model generates a shift towards less energy-intensive modes of production in 
response to an increase in energy prices. Required energy inputs are composed of 
electricity purchases from the electricity sector in the model and direct use of fossil 
fuels. The model allows substitution of these primary fossil energy carriers for 
electricity in sectors where the input-output matrices of the GTAP database record 
intermediate purchases of fossil fuels. At the bottom of the input substitution hierarchy, 
the sectoral production functions allow for imperfect substitutability between coal, 
refined oil and natural gas.  
Figure 2.1: Production Function Nesting Structure 
 
2.2.2. Electricity Supply 
In standard energy-focused top-down CGE models, electricity generation and 
distribution is typically treated as a single production activity. In these models a 
transition towards a higher share of hydro, solar or wind in the power mix is 
represented in a highly stylised abstract form as a substitution of fossil fuel inputs by 
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physical capital under the assumption of a continuous space of available technologies. 
The lack of explicit detail with regard to the characterisation of current and future 
technology options entails the danger that in the case of simulation scenarios involving 
large departures from the initial benchmark equilibrium may violate fundamental 
physical restrictions such as the conservation of matter and energy (Böhringer and 
Rutherford 2008) or exceed other technical feasibility limits (McFarland, Reilly and 
Herzog 2004; Hourcade et al 2006; Bibas and Mejean 2012). Moreover, the lack of 
technological explicitness limits the ability of top-down models to incorporate detailed 
information on cost differentials among alternative energy technologies from 
engineering cost studies and to simulate technology-specific policy measures in a fully 
persuasive manner (Hourcade et al 2006). In response to these limitations of 
conventional top-down CGE models, various approaches to the incorporation of 
detailed ‘bottom up’ information on energy technology options into a CGE modelling 
framework have emerged.5  
The present study adopts a similar hybrid top-down bottom-up approach by treating 
decomposing electricity generation according to power source and by treating 
electricity transmission / distribution as a separate activity. This approach enables us 
to incorporate extant information on levelised cost of electricity (LCOE) differentials by 
power source into the simulation analysis and to consider exogenous policy-driven 
changes in the power mix that are not necessarily driven by changes in relative market 
prices. The system-wide supply price of electricity in the models is effectively 
determined as weighted average of the activity-specific supply prices across the power 
activities. The operational aspects of the power sector decomposition are outlined in 
section 3 below. 
2.2.3. Primary Factor Supply  
The model distinguishes skilled and unskilled labour. The dynamic labour supply paths 
are exogenous and both types of labour are intersectorally mobile. The supply of 
agricultural land and natural resource endowments (forests, minerals, and in the case 
                                                 
5 Examples for the development and application of such hybrid top-down bottom-up models include 
inter alia McFarland, Reilly and Herzog (2004), Böhringer and Löschel (2006), Sue Wing (2008), 
Böhringer and Rutherford (2008 2013), Sassi et al (2010), Boeters and Koornneef (2011), Lanz and 
Rausch (2011), Bibas and  Mejean (2012), Okagawa et al (2012) and Fortes et al (2013). 
 
10 
 
of Ghana crude oil and natural gas) is imperfectly elastic, i.e. the supply of these 
primary factors varies endogenously in response to changes in the corresponding 
factor price. The productive capital stock in each sector a evolves according to the 
dynamic accumulation equation  
K(a,t+1) = I(a,t) + (1 – δ(a))K(a,t),  
where K denotes the installed real capital stock, I(a,t) is real gross investment flowing 
to sector a in period t and δ is the rate of physical capital depreciation. Sectoral gross 
investment is a positive function of a sector’s rate of return to capital relative to the 
economy-wide average return to capital, i.e. the sectoral allocation of aggregate real 
investment is determined by return differentials. Once installed, capital is sector-
specific (i.e. immobile across sectors) while new capital is intersectorally mobile.  
2.2.4. Final Domestic Demand 
Consumer behavior is derived from intra-temporal utility maximising behavior subject 
to within-period budget constraints. Utility functions take the Stone-Geary form, 
yielding a Linear Expenditure System (LES) demand specification.  The commodity 
composition of investment and government demand is kept constant according to the 
observed shares in the benchmark SAM while the total volumes of government and 
investment demand grow in line with aggregate income and are determined by the 
macro closure rules detailed below. 
2.2.5. International Trade 
In all traded commodity groups, imports and goods of domestic origin are treated as 
imperfect substitutes in both final and intermediate demand. Agents’ optimising 
behaviour entails that the expenditure-minimising equilibrium ratio of imports to 
domestic goods in any traded commodity group varies endogenously with the 
corresponding relative price of imports to domestically produced output in that 
commodity group. 
On the supply side, the model takes account of product differentiation between exports 
to the rest of the world and production for the domestic market in all exporting sectors. 
The technologies for conversion of output into exports are described by sectoral 
constant-elasticity-of- transformation (CET) functions. This entails that the profit-
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maximising equilibrium ratio of exports to domestic goods in any exporting sector is 
determined by the price relation between export and home market sales. 
Both Kenya and Ghana are treated as small open economies – i.e. changes in their 
export supply and import demand quantity have no influence on the structure of world 
market prices. 
2.2.6. Equilibrium Conditions and Macro Closure 
The prices for goods, services and primary factors are flexible and adjust in order to 
satisfy the market clearing conditions for output and factor markets. Foreign savings 
and hence the current account balance follow an exogenous time path. This time path 
is kept fixed across the simulation scenarios considered in subsequent sections in 
order to enable meaningful welfare comparisons across the scenarios. This external 
sector closure entails that the real exchange rate adjusts endogenous to maintain 
external balance-of-payments equilibrium. A standard balanced macroeconomic 
closure rule (Lofgren et al 2002) is adopted, according to which the shares of 
government demand, investment demand and hence private household consumption 
demand in total absorption remain invariant. Under this macro closure, household and 
government saving rates adjust residually to establish the macroeconomic saving-
investment balance. 
3. Data Sources and Model Calibration 
3.1. The Social Accounting Matrices for Kenya and Ghana: Overview 
Each model is calibrated to a SAM which reflects the input-output structure of 
production, the commodity composition of demand and the pattern of income 
distribution for the country at a disaggregated level at the start of the simulation 
horizon. Starting point for the construction of the model-conformable SAMs are the 
input-output matrices for Kenya and Ghana contained in the GTAP database version 
9 (Aguiar, Narayanan and McDougall 2016). This data set provides a detailed and 
internally consistent representation the global economy-wide structure of production, 
demand and international trade at a regionally and sectorally disaggregated level. 
GTAP 9a – the latest available version of the database - combines detailed bilateral 
trade and protection data reflecting economic linkages among 140 world regions with 
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individual regional input-output data, which account for intersectoral linkages among 
57 production sectors for the benchmark year 2011.6 
The GTAP database treats electricity generation, transmission and distribution as a 
single aggregate activity and the data on household income and household consumer 
expenditure are for a single aggregate household. For the purposes of the present 
study, both the electricity activity and the household sector are disaggregated as 
detailed below. 
3.2. Disaggregation of the Electricity Sector 
The decomposition of the power activity for each country essentially involves (i) 
splitting the single electricity activity column vector of the original GTAP input-output 
matrix (which contains the annual input cost by input type for the benchmark year) into 
several new columns for the different electricity sub-sectors distinguished in the CGE 
model, and (ii) distributing the cost figures of the original aggregate electricity cost 
vectors horizontally across the new columns in line with available information about 
the cost composition in the electricity sub-sectors and in such a way that the original 
cost totals by input type are preserved. This is a non-trivial problem. The common 
procedure employed in the construction of databases for energy-focused hybrid top-
down bottom-up CGE models is to start with an informed initial estimate for the entries 
in the new sub-industry column vectors and then apply a numerical matrix balancing 
method to enforce the target sub-matrix totals.7  
Peters (2016) constructs a satellite database for GTAP9 which disaggregates the 
GTAP electricity activity for all regions in the database along these lines. However, the 
regional coverage of LCOE estimates used in the construction of the Peters database 
                                                 
6 The raw data for the Ghana country bloc of the GTAP database include a SAM for 2005 constructed 
by Breisinger, Thurlow and Duncan (2007) and the raw data for Kenya in GTAP include a 2001 SAM 
developed at KIPPRA in collaboration with the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), a 
predecessor of the latest available KIPPRA-IFPRI SAM for 2003 (Kiringai, Thurlow and Wanjala 2006 
and Kiringai et al 2007). In the case of Kenya, the GTAP input-output data have been triangulated 
with information from unpublished supply-and-use tables (SUT) for 2009 kindly provided by Dr 
Bernadette Wanjala (KIPPRA). Following minor revisions in the course of this triangulation process, 
the SAM has been rebalanced using a variant of the cross-entropy approach proposed by Robinson, 
Cattaneo and El-Said (2001). For Ghana, no recent SUT data are available. 
 
7 See Peters and Hertel (2016a,b) for a detailed discussion of comparison of existing matrix balancing 
algorithms used in this context and further references to the related technical literature. 
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is incomplete, with country-specific estimates for Africa being notable by their virtual 
absence.8 In cases, where the discrepancies between the row totals implied by the 
initial guesses in the absence of country-specific data and the target GTAP row totals 
is large, the application of the mechanical matrix balancing algorithm can generate 
seriously misleading results. The case of Kenya – flagged up explicitly by Peters 
(2016:231, n12) as a problematic case – illustrates the point: In the benchmark year 
2011 Kenya generates electricity primarily from hydro, thermal (i.e. fossil fuel) and 
geothermal sources.9 Geothermal is not identified as a separate technology in the 
Peters database, but would in principle be covered one-to-one by the residual ‘Other’ 
category in that data base. Yet, attributing the reported cost figures in this category to 
geothermal would lead to seriously misleading results.10  
Therefore, the decomposition of the electricity sectors for the present study uses 
additional country-specific data and information from other studies. For Kenya, the 
electricity activity is disaggregated into transmission and distribution (TD), hydro, 
geothermal, thermal and wind. First, the cost totals for the sub-activities are 
determined: The TD share is based on Peters (2016) while the total generation share 
is distributed across the four generation activities by combining the 2011 electricity 
generation data in GWh reported in Republic of Kenya (2014: Table 33) with the LCOE 
cost differential estimates for Kenya (Table 3.1) reported in Pueyo et al (2016).11 Fossil 
fuel input are entirely allocated to the thermal electricity activity while initial estimates 
for the allocation of other inputs are informed by the cost shares for the different 
generation technologies in the Peters (2016) database and - for geothermal – on cost 
share data from Sue Wing (2008) and Lehr et al (2011).12 Finally, to establish full 
consistency of the cost entries with the GTAP cost totals by input type and the target 
electricity sub-activity column sums, a standard bi-proportional RAS matrix balancing 
algorithm is employed. 
                                                 
8 See Peters (2016: Appendix C). As Peters (2016:216) puts it, ‘(i)ncreasing the LCOE coverage is a 
major opportunity for subsequent versions’. 
9 See Table 4.3 below. 
10 E.g. the reported share of fossil fuel inputs in total cost for this category is more than 70 per cent. 
11 See Table 4.3 below. 
12 These estimates have been further triangulated with the cost shares employed in related other hybrid 
top-down bottom-up CGE studies including Capros et al (2013) and Proenca and St Aubyn (2013). 
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The electricity sector decomposition for Ghana splits the sector into TD, hydro and 
thermal and follows the same procedural approach. The required physical data on 
power generation by technology for the benchmark year 2011 are drawn from EnCG 
(2016). 
The resulting synthetic cost vectors capture the salient stylised facts with regard to 
input intensities of the different electricity generation technologies, namely that hydro, 
geothermal and wind are very capital-intensive and have moderate intermediate input 
requirements, geothermal is particularly skill-intensive and fossil fuel costs are the 
dominant cost factor in thermal generation (and more so in high-fossil-price periods 
such as in the benchmark year 2011). 
Table 3.1 Levelised Cost of Electricity by Technology and Country 
  Ghana Kenya 
Hydro 6.8 - 11.2 7.4 - 10.9 
Wind 12.6 - 19.5 7.7 - 10.3 
Geothermal Not applicable 4.7 - 7.5 
Solar PV 16.0 - 26.9 9.9 - 14.8 
   
Thermal - Oil 19.0 26.0 - 42.0 
Thermal - Gas 13.0 13.3 
Source: Pueyo et al (2016). 
 
3.3. Disaggregation of the Household Accounts 
The household disaggregation for Ghana distinguishes five household groups - 
labelled H1 (bottom quintile) to H5 (top quintile) - by household income quintile in the 
benchmark year. The available data sources do not support a consistent rural-urban 
split. Information on the distribution of factor income is drawn from the Ghana Living 
Standards Survey (GLSS 6) (GSS 2014: Section 10). To establish full consistency with 
the economy-wide functional household income distribution by factor type given by the 
GTAP database while preserving the GLSS factor income distribution by household 
quintile, a bi-proportional matrix balancing algorithm is used. In the benchmark year 
households in the top quintile receive 45.6 per cent of total income while the share of 
the bottom quintile is 5.3 per cent. For H1 to H4 the main income source is low-skilled 
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employment (including imputed labour income from self-employment), whereas the 
dominant income source for H5 is skilled employment. Top quintile households also 
receive the largest shares of total capital and natural resource rent income. The 
decomposition of the aggregate household consumption vector by commodity group 
from the GTAP database uses household expenditure shares by quintile derived from 
GLSS. 
For Kenya, no recent representative household income and expenditure survey is 
available. The last survey is the Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey (KIHBS) 
2005/06. As the published KIHBS results provides insufficient detail on the income 
distribution by income type, the household sector decomposition for Ghana draws 
upon the household disaggregation generated by Kiringai et al (2007) for the KIPPRA-
IFPRI SAM, which is based on an earlier survey for 1997 and distinguishes urban and 
rural households by expenditure decile. Employing such a dated source is obviously 
unsatisfactory. However, Gakuro and Mathenge (2012:Table 2) show that there is 
remarkably little change between the 1997 and the 2005/06 expenditure distribution, 
except for a marked 5 percentage-point gain for the top urban decile primarily at the 
expense of the ninth and eighth decile and to a lesser extent at the expense of the 
bottom two deciles. Thus, across broader household aggregates the distribution is 
almost stable between 1997 and 2005/06, e.g. the share of the top 5 rural deciles 
remains constant at 75 per cent, while the share of the top 5 urban deciles rises 
modestly from 77 to 79 per cent.13 Correspondingly, the Kenya SAM and model uses 
a coarse household disaggregation with four household groups – labelled Rural Low, 
Rural High, Urban Low and Urban High – which represent respectively the bottom and 
top 50 per cent rural and urban households in the benchmark year. In short, a more 
detailed household disaggregation is not supported by the available data at this point 
in time. 
 
                                                 
13 An inspection of the corresponding KIHBS and 1997 data in World Bank (2008) and in the UNU-
WIDER (2017) WIID database confirms this finding. It must be noted though that over this period the 
urban share of Kenya’s total population has risen from 18.9 to 21.7 per cent and further to 24.0 per cent 
in our benchmark year 2011 according to World Bank data.  
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3.4. SAM Dimensions 
The benchmark SAM for Kenya distinguishes 19 production activities (Table 3.2), 7 
primary production factors including 3 sector-specific natural resource factors (forest, 
fish and mineral stocks) beside skilled and unskilled labour, capital, and agricultural 
land and 4 household categories. The Ghana SAM for the benchmark year contains 
18 production activities (Table 3.3), 8 primary factors including oil / gas resource 
stocks in addition to the same factors as in the Kenya SAM, and 5 household groups. 
Both SAMs contain 18 commodity groups (Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, Crude Oil, 
Natural Gas, Other Mining, Beverages and Tobacco, Processed Food, Textiles and 
Clothing including Footwear and Leather Goods, Refined Petrol, Chemicals including 
Plastic and Rubber Goods, Other Light Manufacturing, Other Heavy Manufacturing, 
Electricity, Construction Services, Trade Services, Other Services). 
3.5. Model Calibration  
The numerical calibration process involves the determination of the initial model 
parameters in such a way that the equilibrium solution for the benchmark year exactly 
replicates the benchmark SAM. The selection of values for the sectoral factor 
elasticities of substitution, the elasticities of substitution between imports and 
domestically produced output by commodity group, and the target income elasticities 
of household demand is informed by available econometric evidence from secondary 
sources and uses estimates provided by the GTAP behavioral parameter database 
(Hertel and van der Mensbrugghe 2016). The region-specific income elasticity 
estimates reported in that source for a representative single aggregated household 
are further differentiated across the lower and higher income households in the model, 
e.g. for necessary goods such as food products with an observed higher budget share 
in low-income households, the initial elasticities are raised vis-à-vis the central GTAP 
values and vice versa for high-income households and ‘luxury’ goods. 
Given the selection of these free parameters, the various share parameters of the 
models – including the effective initial direct and indirect model tax rates – are then 
entirely identified by the benchmark SAMs. Several of the model parameters, such as 
the factor productivity parameters governing the rate of autonomous technical 
progress are time-variant in the dynamic simulation analysis. The dynamic calibration 
17 
 
of these time-variant parameters is discussed in the context of the description of the 
dynamic baseline construction process in sections 4 and 5 below. 
Table 3.2: Kenya Model Production Sectors 
Short Code Description Share in GTAP GDP 2011 
Agriculture Agriculture 0.224 
Forestry Forestry 0.013 
Fishing Fishing 0.006 
Mining Mining and Quarrying 0.006 
ProcFood Food Processing 0.168 
BevTob Beverages and Tobacco 0.093 
TexCloth Textiles, Clothing, Footwear and Leather 0.011 
Petrol Petrol Refining 0.001 
Chemics Chemicals, Rubber and Platic Products 0.009 
OLightMnf Other Light Manufacturing 0.036 
OHeavyMnf Other Heavy Manufacturing 0.018 
ElTD Electricity Transmission and Distribution 0.001 
ElGeoTh Geo-Thermal Electricity Generation 0.002 
ElHydro Hydro Electricity Generation  0.004 
ElThermal Fossil Fuel Based Electricity Generation 0.002 
ElWind Wind Powered  Electricity Generation 0.000 
Construction Construction Services 0.035 
TradeSv Trade Services 0.048 
TransSv Transport Services 0.061 
OServices Other Services 0.269 
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Table 3.3: Ghana Model Production Sectors 
Short Code Description Share in GTAP GDP 2011 
Agriculture Agriculture 0.236 
Forestry Forestry 0.007 
Fishing Fishing 0.018 
CrudeOil Crude Oil and Natural Gas 0.063 
Mining Mining and Quarrying 0.008 
ProcFood Food Processing 0.042 
BevTob Beverages and Tobacco 0.010 
TexCloth Textiles, Clothing, Footwear and Leather 0.012 
Petrol Petrol Refining 0.001 
Chemics Chemicals, Rubber and Platic Products 0.008 
OLightMnf Other Light Manufacturing 0.018 
OHeavyMnf Other Heavy Manufacturing 0.031 
ElTD Electricity Transmission and Distribution 0.001 
ElHydro Hydro Electricity Generation  0.008 
ElThermal Fossil Fuel Based Electricity Generation 0.000 
Construction Construction Services 0.138 
TradeSv Trade Services 0.054 
TransSv Transport Services 0.105 
OServices Other Services 0.240 
 
4. Dynamic Scenario Analysis: Kenya 
4.1. Overview 
The simulation analysis for Kenya considers four dynamic scenarios up to 2025 that 
differ with respect to (i) the evolution of the power mix in on-grid electricity generation 
and (ii) the evolution of world market fossil fuel prices. Table 4.1 provides a concise 
outline of the alternative scenario assumptions along these two dimensions.  
The specification of the lower carbon scenarios is motivated by the results of the 
comparative LCOE analysis by Pueyo et al (2016 2017) which indicates a clear cost 
advantage of geothermal over all other electricity generation technologies and by the 
presence of a considerable potential for the further expansion of geothermal capacity 
in the country. The consideration of alternative conceivable time paths for the evolution 
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of international fossil fuel prices is motivated by the strong sensitivity of the cost 
differences between thermal and renewables to fossil price projections. 
Table 4.1: Schematic Outline of Scenarios for Kenya 
 Business as Usual Power 
Mix 
Lower Carbon Power Mix 
Low Fossil Fuel 
Prices 
Baseline Scenario 
 
Power mix follows current 10-
Year Plan: 
Rising share of Thermal 
Falling share of Hydro 
Constant share of Geothermal 
Rising but small share of Wind 
_________________________ 
 
Oil import price 50% below 2011 
level; Gas import price 55% below 
2011 level 
Lower Carbon Scenario 
 
 
 
Falling share of Thermal 
Falling share of Hydro 
Rising Share of Geothermal 
Rising but small share of Wind 
__________________________ 
 
Oil import price 50% below 2011 
level; Gas import price 55% 
below 2011 level 
High Fossil Fuel 
Prices 
High Fossil Fuel Price 
Scenario 
 
Power mix follows current 10-
Year Plan: 
Rising share of Thermal 
Falling share of Hydro 
Constant share of Geothermal 
Rising but small share of Wind 
_________________________ 
 
Oil import price 19% below 2011 
level; Gas import price 17% below 
2011 level 
Lower Carbon HFFP 
Scenario 
 
 
 
Falling share of Thermal 
Falling share of Hydro 
Rising Share of Geothermal 
Rising but small share of Wind 
__________________________ 
 
Oil import price 19% below 2011 
level; Gas import price 17% 
below 2011 level 
 
4.2. Baseline Scenario 
The dynamic baseline scenario provides a projection of the evolution of Kenya’s 
economy up to 2025 under the assumptions that international oil and gas prices 
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remain at low 2015/16 levels and that the evolution of the electricity generation 
capacity from hydro, geothermal and wind follows Kenya’s 10 Year Power Sector 
Expansion Plan 2014-2024 (Republic of Kenya 2014) under the Plan’s moderate load 
growth scenario. 
The construction of the baseline scenario starts from the 2011 benchmark SAM 
outlined in section 3. For the period up to 2015, the forward projection takes account 
of the most recent available data observations, while the projections from 2016 to 2025 
draw upon expert forecasts for the determination of the main model-exogenous drivers 
of economic growth (Table 4.2).14 
4.2.1. Population and Labour Force Growth 
Population and labour force growth is based on the UN DESA (2015) medium-variant 
projections commonly used in contemporary long-run scenario studies. According to 
these projections, the total population of Kenya rises from 42.5 million in 2012 to 58.6 
million in 2025. As shown, the scenario takes into account that over this period the 
annual growth rate of the working-age population – and thus the labour force growth 
rate in the model under the assumption of a constant participation rate - remains 
considerably higher than the population growth rate.  
4.2.2. Total Factor Productivity and GDP Growth  
The second exogenous driver of economic growth in the model is the economy-wide 
total factor productivity (TFP) growth rate, which reflects the speed of autonomous 
technical progress. In the development of the baseline scenario, the time path for the 
annual TFP growth rate is determined indirectly by imposing a target growth path for 
Kenya’s real gross domestic product (GDP) (see Table 4.2) and by calibrating the TFP 
parameter of the model dynamically to match this target growth path. Technically, to 
obtain the TFP growth path the model is first simulated in a dynamic calibration mode 
in which GDP is exogenised while the TFP parameter is treated as an endogenous 
variable. When the model is then simulated in normal mode, with GDP as an 
endogenous variable and exogenous imposition of the TFP growth path obtained in 
                                                 
14 The final specification of the baseline scenario benefited from insightful discussions with Helen 
Osiolo, Bernadette Wanjala, James Gachanja and Nahashon Mwongera (all KIPPRA) during a visit to 
Nairobi in November 2016.  
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the dynamic calibration run, the model solution exactly replicates the target GDP 
growth path. 
The GDP baseline scenario growth rates up to 2015 are the reported actual national 
accounts figure and the projections up to 2018 are taken from KIPPRA (2016). The 
assumed constant growth rate of 7.5 per cent per annum beyond 2018 is an optimistic 
compromise between the annual growth rate target of 10 per cent envisaged in 
Kenya’s aspirational Vision 2030 development plan (Republic of Kenya 2007) for the 
same period and the growth rates projected by the CGE model under the assumption 
that TFP grows at a moderate pace that is more in line with the country’s actual 
observed growth performance over recent years: The average annual TFP growth rate 
for the period 2011-2015 that is required in the model to replicate Kenya’s actual GDP 
growth reported in Table 4.2 is 0.8 per cent and the corresponding rate for the period 
2016 to 2018 is 2.8 per cent.15  To reach the assumed 7.5 per cent GDP growth rate 
beyond 2018, the average annual TFP growth rate needs to rise further to reach 3.3 
per cent. Thus, the baseline scenario implies a strong acceleration in the growth rate 
of technical progress, yet the TFP growth rate figures are not entirely implausible, 
provided a significant portion of the measures to modernise the economy envisaged 
in the Kenya Vision 2030 are actually implemented over the time horizon considered 
here. However, GDP growth rates on the order of 10 per cent per annum would require 
TFP growth rates well above 5 per cent. Assuming a sustained productivity 
acceleration of such an order would seem to be unrealistic, given Kenya’s actual 
growth performance under the Vision 2030 plan so far.16 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 This CGE-model-determined figure matches closely with the corresponding growth-accounting-based 
estimate of 0.8 per cent TFP for Kenya in 2015 and average annual TFP growth of 0.6 per cent over 
the period 2011 to 2015 presented in The Conference Board (2016). 
16 As shown in Republic of Kenya (2013: Table 2.1), in every single year of the first five-year 
implementation phase (2008/9 to 2012/13) Kenya missed the Vision 2030 GDP growth targets by a 
wide margin (i.e. by 4.0 to 4.6 percentage points). Despite a downward revision of the target rates for 
2013 to 2015 (ibid: Table 2.2), Kenya’s actual growth performance remained well below target 
subsequently, and the KIPPRA expert projections for 2016 to 2018 (Table 4 above) are likewise far 
below the annual 10 per cent plan target. 
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Table 4.2: Key Features of Dynamic Baseline Scenario - Kenya 
 Annual Growth Rates   World Market Prices 
Year GDP GDP per cap. Labor Force Population Population CrudeOil  Natural Gas 
 % % %  1000 Price Index (2011 = 1) 
2012 4.6 1.9 2.87 2.71   42 543 1.01 1.02 
2013 5.7 3.0 2.89 2.70   43 693 0.98 1.23 
2014 5.3 2.6 2.93 2.68   44 864 0.89 1.16 
2015 5.6 3.0 2.96 2.65   46 050 0.51 0.83 
2016 5.7 3.1 2.96 2.61   47 251 0.50 0.44 
2017 6.1 3.5 2.99 2.57   48 467 0.50 0.44 
2018 6.1 3.6 3.02 2.53   49 695 0.50 0.44 
2019 7.5 5.0 3.04 2.50   50 935 0.50 0.44 
2020 7.5 5.0 3.05 2.46   52 187 0.50 0.44 
2021 7.5 5.1 2.96 2.42   53 448 0.50 0.44 
2022 7.5 5.1 2.98 2.38   54 719 0.50 0.44 
2023 7.5 5.2 2.98 2.34   56 001 0.50 0.44 
2024 7.5 5.2 2.96 2.32   57 298 0.50 0.44 
2025 7.5 5.2 2.94 2.29   58 610 0.50 0.44 
Sources: GDP growth: 2012, KNBS (2016); 2013-18 KIPPRA (2016); Population and labour  
force growth: UN DESA (2015), medium-variant projections. 
4.2.3. Electricity Sector  
The assumed evolution of the power mix in the baseline scenario draws upon Kenya’s 
10 Year Power Sector Expansion Plan 2014-2024 (Republic of Kenya 2014) while 
taking into account that under the assumed baseline economic growth path, the 
electricity demand growth over the simulation horizon endogenously generated by the 
CGE model is significantly lower than in the 10-Year Plan: This plan considers a high 
growth scenario with a ‘fast-tracked’ implementation of a range of energy-intensive 
Vision 2030 flagship investment projects and a ‘moderate load growth scenario’ with  
a ‘deferred’ implementation of these flagship projects.17  
                                                 
17 These include inter alia major investments in iron ore smelting capacity, the eventual electrification 
of the new standard gauge rail link between Nairobi and Mombasa (initially served by diesel-fuelled 
locomotives), the development of a large-scale ICT park at Kenzo City south of Nairobi, the 
establishment of several special economic zones and the development of the Lamu-Port Southern 
Sudan-Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) Corridor project. 
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 The high growth scenario assumes that GDP growth reaches 10.1 per cent p.a. by 
2018 and accelerates further to 12 per cent p.a. by 2024. Effective electricity demand 
is projected to grow at average annual rate of 17.4 per cent between 2015 and 2024 
to reach 56,447 GWh by 2024 (Republic of Kenya 2014: Table 28) Based on least 
cost power expansion simulations, this scenario proposes a strong expansion in hydro 
capacity (+74 per cent relative to 2013) and massive expansions in geothermal 
(+1,200 per cent), thermal (~ +2,400 per cent) and wind (~ +18,600 per cent from a 
tiny base) by 2024 to satisfy this demand growth (Republic of Kenya  2014: Table 
25).18 The projected domestic generation shares in 2024 under average hydrological 
conditions in this scenario are 47.2 per cent for geothermal, 42.5 per cent for thermal, 
9.5 per cent for hydro and 0.8 per cent for wind. The scenario envisages that coal-fired 
power generation starts in 2016 and then rapidly expands to reach a share of 17.4 per 
cent in total generation by 2024. With respect to the plausibility and economic viability 
of this scenario, the Plan itself states that: 
 ‘under the fast-tracked scenario, there would be a huge power surplus if 
 demand does not grow fast enough which could lead to stranded investments 
 and/or high power tariffs. Additionally, the report reveals that high cost 
 technologies such as the thermal power plants particularly those planned for 
 commissioning in 2014 may be poorly dispatched in the medium to long term 
 while base plants such as coal and LNG may end up being run at below optimal 
 levels of less than 70%’ (Republic of Kenya 2014:5) 
According to the latest KNBS (2016b) figures actual electricity generation in 2015 was 
some 30 per cent below the corresponding 2015 projection under this scenario and 
the plans for the construction of Kenya’s first coal-fired power plant in Lamu as well as 
related plans for the exploitation of domestic coal resources detected in the Mui Basin 
are on hold.19 Thus, the 10-Year Plan’s high growth scenario provides no suitable 
basis for the development of a plausible baseline scenario for purposes of the present 
study. 
                                                 
18 These simulations are an update of the earlier 2013 Least Cost Power Sector Development Plan 
(Republic of Kenya 2013b). 
19 See Praxides (2016) and Kenya Engineer (2016). 
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The ‘moderate load growth’ scenario of the 10-Year plan assumes that annual GDP 
growth rises to 10 per cent by 2020 and that the economy continues to grow at that 
rate up to 2024. The aforementioned flagship investments are implemented slightly 
later than in the high growth scenarios and the connection rate reaches 60 per cent 
by 2024. Effective electricity demand is projected to grow at average annual rate of 
15.5 per cent between 2015 and 2024 and reaches 38,413 GWh by 2024 (Republic of 
Kenya 2014: Table 33). Hydro capacity is projected to jump by 61 per cent in 2019 
relative to a constant 2014-2018 level with no further expansion up to 2024, 
geothermal capacity expands by 288 per cent between 2014 and 2024, thermal by 
322 per cent, and wind generation capacity expands by a factor of 24.5 relative to the 
small 2014 level (Republic of Kenya 2014: Table 32). The projected domestic 
generation shares in 2024 in this scenario are 48.2 per cent for geothermal, 39.2 per 
cent for thermal, 11.7 per cent for hydro and 0.8 per cent for wind. Coal-fired power 
plants start operating from 2019 and reach a share of 20.9 per cent in total domestic 
electricity generation by 2024. 
As discussed in section 4.2.2 above, our baseline scenario is an optimistic scenario 
but uses lower GDP growth projections than the 10-Year Plan’s so-called ‘moderate 
load growth scenario’. Correspondingly, the electricity demand growth projected by 
the CGE model - which equates to an annualised average growth rate of 12.8 per cent 
over the period 2015 to 2025 - is significantly below the Plan’s average annual growth 
rate of 15.5 per cent. In absolute terms, this demand growth differential translates into 
a marked difference between the 2025 CGE-model-based baseline projection of 
35,641 GWh (Table 4.3) for domestic supply and a one-year forward projection of the 
Plan’s 2024 domestic supply, which amounts to nearly 44,000 GWh.20 It is noteworthy, 
that this difference is larger than the entire projected coal-based generation for 2024 
(7,965 GWh) according to the Plan. Thus, no coal-fired power-plants at all are required 
in our baseline scenario. 
 
 
                                                 
20 Projected total supply (=effective demand) for 2024 is 38,413 GWh and projected 2024 imports are 
356GWh (Republic of Kenya 2014: Table 33). (38,413 – 356)(1+0.155) = 43,956. 
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Table 4.3: Domestic Electricity Generation by Type – Baseline Scenario 
  Electricity Generation  (GWh) 
Year Total Hydro Geothermal Thermal Wind 
2011 7250 3427 1453 2352 18 
2015 10675 3427 5333 1868 47 
2020 22735 4466 11343 6829 97 
2025 35641 4466 18331 12529 315 
  Shares  (%) 
2011 100.0 47.3 20.0 32.4 0.2 
2015 100.0 32.1 50.0 17.5 0.4 
2020 100.0 19.6 49.9 30.0 0.4 
2025 100.0 12.5 51.4 35.2 0.9 
Sources: All figures for 2011 and all GWh figures for Hydro, Geothermal and Wind:  
Republic of Kenya (2014: Tables 6 and 33). Domestic total generation figures are model- 
determined and Thermal shares beyond 2015 follow residually. Actual provisional 2015 figures  
in KNBS (2016b) released after the completion of the baseline construction: Total: 9456 GWh,  
Hydro: 3463 GWh (36.6%), Geothermal: 4521 GWh (47.8%), Thermal 1412 GWh (14.9%). 
 
As shown in Table 4.3, the baseline scenario assumes that hydro, geothermal and 
wind generation evolves in line with the moderate load growth scenario of the 10 Year 
Power Sector Expansion Plan while thermal (gas- and oil-fired) generation fills the gap 
between total demand and non-fossil-based supply.21 Correspondingly, the direction 
of the changes in the power mix over the period 2015 to 2025 are broadly in line with 
the 10-Year Plan moderate scenario, in the sense that (i) the hydro share drops 
markedly despite a substantial increase in absolute capacity, (ii) the geothermal share 
remains roughly constant following the rapid increase over the period 2011 to 2015, 
which means that absolute geothermal generation grows strongly and approximately 
in proportion to total electricity demand, (iii) the share of thermal rises strongly, and 
(iv) the wind share roughly doubles but remains below one per cent. 
                                                 
21 With a slight lag over the 2021-2025 period, so that the Plan’s generation figures for 2024 are realised 
in year 2025 of the baseline scenario. 
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The main difference to the Plan scenario is that, due to the lower overall electricity 
demand growth, the baseline 2025 thermal share is slightly lower (35.2 versus 39.2 
per cent) and greener as it contains no coal-fired generation. 
According to the moderate load growth scenario, the share of diesel within total non-
coal thermal generation, which was 100 per cent in the benchmark year 2011, drops 
markedly to 58 per cent in 2015 and further to 14 per cent in 2024 as diesel-fired 
generation is replaced by gas-fired generation. However, as the recent cancellation of 
the planned Dongu Kundu gas power station project indicates, such a shift appears 
unlikely to happen within the time horizon of the present study.22 Thus the baseline 
scenario assumes that thermal generation continues to remain entirely heavy-fuel-oil-
fired. Nevertheless the cost disadvantage of thermal relative to geothermal drops 
significantly relative to the initial 2011 differential as a result of the assumed permanent 
oil price drop. 
The baseline scenario captures the increase in household connectivity rates and the 
additional increase in commercial electricity demand assumed in the 10-Year Plan in 
a stylised form through gradual exogenous increases in the model parameters 
governing the shares of electricity consumption in total household consumption and in 
intermediate consumption.23  
The additional increases in commercial electricity demand due to the promotion of the 
said Kenya Vision 2030 flagship projects and due to wider across-the-board shifts to 
more electrified modes of production as the Kenyan economy develops are captured 
in the CGE model via gradual increases in the electricity input-output coefficients for 
sectors where the 2011 GTAP electricity input-output coefficients are well below the 
average across lower middle income countries in the GTAP database. Shifts to more 
electrified modes of production reduce the need for physical labour and basic capital 
inputs to some extent, and so the technology parameters governing the demand for 
                                                 
22 See Okuti (2016). 
23 As a technical aside for readers interested in the mechanics of the CGE model, this requires a 
recalibration of all other LES demand system parameters at each annual time step of the dynamic 
solution loop in order to maintain the theoretical consistency of the model. It is also worth noting in this 
context that the budget shares of electricity in total household spending in the model would increase 
even in the absence of exogenous shifts in the marginal budget share parameters, as the assumed 
income elasticities of household demand for electricity for Kenya (see section 3 above) are well above 
unity across all household categories. 
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primary factors are gradually revised downwards accordingly in these sectors. Figure 
4.4 displays the baseline 2025 shares of electricity in total production cost for all 
sectors in which this share exceeds one per cent. 
Figure 4.4: Share of Electricity Cost in Total Baseline Production Cost 2025 – 
Selected Sectors 
 
 
4.3. Lower Carbon Scenario 
4.3.1. Scenario Specification 
Considering alternative conceivable pathways towards a less carbon-intensive power 
mix, the LCOE analysis for the GGDA project by Pueyo et al (2016) identifies 
geothermal electricity generation as the most promising technology option for Kenya.  
This assessment is in line with Kenyan government’s own assessment in the 10 Year 
Power Sector Expansion Plan: 
 ‘In Kenya, more than 14 high temperature potential sites occur along Rift Valley 
 with an estimated potential of more than 10,000 MW. Other locations include 
 Homa Hills in Nyanza, Mwananyamala at the Coast and Nyambene Ridges in 
 Meru. The expansion to existing geothermal operations offers the least cost, 
 environmentally clean source of energy (green) and highest potential to the 
 country’. (Republic of Kenya 2014:101). 
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The following simulation analysis contemplates a deliberately drastic scenario in which 
the geothermal share in total domestic generation increases from 2018 onwards along 
a steep linear schedule to reach 75 per cent in 2025, so that the 2025 geothermal 
share is 23.6 percentage points higher than in the baseline. The thermal share drops 
correspondingly from 35.2 per cent in the 2025 baseline to 11.6 per cent (Table 4.5 
and Figure 4.6). The hydro and wind shares remain unchanged. In absolute terms, 
this assumed expansion of geothermal electricity generation by 2025 is very close to 
the 10 Year Plan’s least-cost high growth scenario, in which geothermal is projected 
to generate 26,000 GWh by 2024.  
Table 4.5: Geothermal and Thermal Shares in Total Power Mix – Lower Carbon 
Scenario 
(Percentage Shares) 
Year Baseline Lower Carbon 
  Geothermal Thermal Geothermal Thermal 
2015 50.0 17.5 50.0 17.5 
2016 52.7 17.6 52.7 17.6 
2017 53.9 18.9 53.9 18.9 
2018 51.9 24.2 58.7 17.4 
2019 50.7 27.6 62.4 15.9 
2020 49.9 30.0 65.4 14.6 
2021 50.8 30.8 68.7 12.9 
2022 51.4 31.7 71.3 11.8 
2023 51.7 32.6 73.2 11.2 
2024 51.7 33.8 74.4 11.1 
2025 51.4 35.2 75.0 11.6 
 
For a proper interpretation of this scenario it is important to emphasise that the falling 
share of thermal does not imply an absolute contraction of thermal generation. Given 
the strong overall electricity demand growth, thermal generation still grows year on 
year, albeit at a lower rate than in the baseline (Figure 4.7). 
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Figure 4.6: Power Mix in Baseline and Lower Carbon Scenario 
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Figure 4.7: Annual Electricity Generation in Baseline and Lower Carbon 
Scenario 
(in GWh) 
 
 
4.3.2. Results 
The assumed gradual shift from high-cost thermal to lower-cost geothermal electricity 
generation entails a notable drop in the effective average supply price relative to the 
baseline scenario. As shown in Figure 4.8, in 2025 the domestic electricity price – here 
expressed relative to the equilibrium wage of unskilled workers – is over 12 per cent 
lower than in the baseline scenario. The reduction in the cost of electricity affects the 
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production costs and thus the supply prices across all sectors and is more pronounced 
in sectors with a higher share of electricity in total cost (Figure 4.8) such as mining, 
the chemical industry and heavy manufacturing than in sectors with a low power 
intensity. 
Figure 4.8: Impact on Domestic Producer Prices – Lower Carbon Scenario 
2025 
(Percentage deviation of price relative to unskilled wage from 2025 baseline) 
 
 
The assumed low carbon transition entails a strong reduction in fossil fuel imports. 
Both refined petrol and crude oil imports drop by nearly ten per cent in volume terms 
relative to the baseline scenario towards 2025 (Figure 4.8). The indirect effect on crude 
oil imports arises due to the fact that in the baseline scenario Kenya’s domestic petrol 
refining sector – which actually ceased production in the second half of 2013 – is 
reactivated as envisaged in the 2015 National Energy and Petroleum Policy Draft 
(Republic of Kenya 2015) and as part of the aforementioned LAPSSET flagship 
development. In the baseline projection this sector operates at a modest scale using 
imported crude oil, with a negligible 2025 baseline contribution to GDP and total 
employment.  
As Kenya remains a net importer of fossil fuels in the baseline scenario, the drop in 
the fossil fuel import bill is associated with a real exchange rate appreciation on the 
order of 0.7 per cent. The real appreciation lowers in tendency the prices of imports 
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relative to domestically produced goods from the perspective of domestic residents. 
This induces a substitution effect towards imports for commodities in cases where the 
exchange rate effect dominates the simultaneous drop in the prices of domestic output 
due to the electricity cost reduction in the new equilibrium. This substitution effect 
affects both imports of final goods and intermediate inputs. A further positive effect on 
imports across all final goods arises due the positive aggregate real income effects 
associated with the shift towards lower-cost electricity generation shown below. Thus, 
Figure 4.9 shows moderate welfare-raising increases in the import quantities relative 
to baseline levels for most traded non-fuel goods and services and these are generally 
more pronounced for the commodity groups with smaller domestic supply price 
reductions according to Figure 4.8. 
Figure 4.9: Impact on Real Import Volumes by Commodity Group – Lower 
Carbon Scenario 2025 
(Percentage deviation from 2025 baseline) 
 
Note: This figure excludes commodity groups with negligible shares in Kenya’s total imports. 
 
On the export side, the real exchange rate appreciation effect per se reduces in 
tendency the price of exports relative to the price obtained in the domestic market from 
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sectors. An exception is heavy manufacturing, which is the sector with the highest 
electricity cost share. In this case, the cost reduction effect dominates the exchange 
rate effect, so that exports expand. 
The trade effects shown in Figure 4.9 and 4.10 can also be explained from a balance-
of-payments perspective: The reduction in the fossil fuel import bill relaxes the 
balance-of-payments constraint as it allows domestic residents to enjoy 
simultaneously an increase in real imports and a higher share in domestically 
produced output, as less of that output needs to be shipped abroad to pay the import 
bill. 
Figure 4.10: Impact on Real Export Volumes by Commodity Group – Lower 
Carbon Scenario 2025 
(Percentage deviation from 2025 baseline) 
 
Note: The figure excludes commodity groups for which both the baseline share in total export 
revenue is small (<2.5 per cent) and the export/output share is small (<10 per cent). 
 
The equilibrium impact on real gross output by production sector for 2025 compared 
to the baseline scenario is shown in Figure 4.11. The sectoral employment effects 
have the same direction and broadly the same orders of magnitude, and are therefore 
not separately plotted. Not surprisingly, in percentage terms the effect on the size of 
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to total employment the associated employment reallocation effects are tiny. The 
domestic power sector expands as the drop in electricity prices induces additional 
demand. 
It is worth emphasising that no sector contracts in absolute terms and thus no sector 
sheds existing workers along the dynamic scenario time path. A negative-signed 
output effect in Figure 4.11 merely indicates that the sector grows at a lower rate and 
that new workers are hired a slower pace than in the baseline scenario. E.g., while the 
domestic refining sector at the 2025 endpoint of the simulation horizon is projected to 
be nearly 10 per cent smaller than in the baseline scenario for the same year, the 
sector is still 127 per cent larger in 2025 than in 2027. 
In line with economic theory, the real exchange appreciation shifts in tendency 
productive resources from traded to non-traded activities. Among the non-power 
sectors that expand relative to baseline are all sectors that have simultaneously 
negligible or small export / output shares and negligible or little competition from 
imports in their domestic market, such as construction services the fishery sector, and 
trade services. In contrast, the small domestic mining sector with its baseline export-
output ratio of over 75 per cent and an import share of over 50 per cent in Kenya’s 
domestic demand for mining products is squeezed noticeably as mining exports drop 
and mining imports rise. The sectors that expand despite relatively high trade shares 
are heavy manufacturing are heavy manufacturing, which – as noted earlier – are 
among the most electricity-intensive sectors and thus benefit disproportionally from 
the reduction in energy input costs. However, the main message from Figure 4.11 is 
that the effects of the assumed low carbon transition on the sectoral composition of 
output and employment are very moderate. 
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Figure 4.11: Impact on Real Output by Sector – Lower Carbon Scenario 2025 
(Percentage deviation from 2025 baseline) 
 
 
The real resource savings associated with the switch to a lower-cost mode of electricity 
generation is reflected in a moderately positive transitory effect on GDP growth as 
shown in Figure 4.12. Like in a standard Solow growth model, the long-run growth rate 
in this multi-sectoral dynamic CGE model is exogenously determined by the sum of 
the aggregate growth rate of technical progress and the labour force growth rate. As 
these rates remain the same as in the baseline, the annual GDP growth rate in a 
hypothetical dynamic long-run equilibrium without further changes in exogenous 
parameter would eventually converge back to the baseline growth rates, yet the 
positive effect on the level of GDP is of course permanent along such a steady state 
path. The cumulative effect of the small annual growth rate increments reported in 
Figure 4.12 over the period 2018 to 2025 entails that the level of real GDP by 2025 is 
1.1 per cent higher than in the baseline scenario. 
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Figure 4.12: Annual Growth Rate of Real GDP – Baseline and Low Carbon 
Scenario 
(in Per cent) 
 
 
Turning to the effects on the functional income distribution – that is the distribution of 
primary income by type of factor – Figure 4.13 displays the impacts on real factor 
prices (i.e. nominal factor prices deflated by the consumer price index) in 2020 and 
2025 relative to the baseline level in the corresponding year. By 2025 the real returns 
to all factors except mineral resources are slightly higher than in the baseline. Capital 
returns rise relative to labour wages and the wage gap between skilled and unskilled 
increases marginally.  
The differential factor price effect arise from factor intensity differentials between 
sectors that grow quicker and sectors that grow slower than in the baseline (recall 
Figure 4.11). On balance, the higher-growing sectors as a group are relatively skill- 
and capital-intensive and thus their additional factor input demand drives up capital 
returns and skilled wages more than unskilled wages.  
The natural resource rent drop is due to the growth slow-down of the domestic mining 
sector which is the sole user of the mineral endowment factor in the model. The reason 
for the reversal of the effect on agricultural land rents is related to the fact that 
electricity use in agriculture is initially very low but grows over time with technical 
progress and the rise in rural access rates. Thus, agriculture initially benefits very little 
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from the drop in electricity prices while being hit by the exchange rate appreciation 
effect on agricultural exports and imports (Figure 4.9 and 4.10). As a result, agricultural 
output drops marginally (by 0.1 per cent) below baseline levels over the initial period 
up to 2020 but then recovers subsequently (and ends up 0.1 per cent above base level 
by 2025) as the direct and indirect input cost reduction effects become more 
pronounced over time.24 
For households with a single source of factor income, Figure 4.13 directly indicates 
the direction of the effects on total factor income. Figure 4.14 shows the implications 
for mixed-income households with factor income mixes equal to the income 
compositions of the four household categories the benchmark SAM. Both lower and 
higher income households gain. However, since the urban and rural high-income 
groups have higher shares of capital and skilled labour in their total income mix than 
the low-income groups, the former groups gain disproportionally. 
In other words, as far as this rather coarse-grained distributional analysis based on 
outdated underlying raw data goes, the low-carbon transition has a pro-poor effect in 
an absolute or ‘weak’ sense (namely that the poorer households are better off than in 
the baseline), but is not pro-poor in a relative or ‘strong’ sense (i.e. the poorer 
households do not gain disproportionally).25 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24 E.g. the drop in chemical fertiliser prices. 
25 See Willenbockel (2015) for critical reflections on the recent literature concerned with pro-poor low-
carbon development in this context. 
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Figure 4.13: Impact on Factor Returns – Low Carbon Scenario 
(Percentage deviation of factor prices relative to CPI baseline level 2020 and 2025) 
 
 
Figure 4.14: Impact on Real Household Income – Low Carbon Scenario 
(Percentage deviation from Baseline level 2020 and 2025)  
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4.4. High Fossil Fuel Price Scenario 
As the cost differentials between thermal and renewable technologies are necessarily 
contingent on the assumptions about future fossil fuel prices over the lifetime of 
thermal power plants, and the results of the quantitative low-carbon scenario analysis 
are driven by the size of these cost differentials, section 4.5 assesses the sensitivity 
of the findings in the previous section to a variation in the assumed exogenous 
international fossil fuel price time paths. In contrast to the baseline scenario, crude oil 
and refined petrol world prices are now assumed to return to higher levels beyond 
2016. More specifically, between 2016 and 2018 oil prices rise linearly to a level that 
is 62 per cent higher than the 2018 baseline price (but still 19 per cent lower than the 
2011 benchmark price) and then stay put at that level beyond 2018.26 
The high fossil fuel price scenario under baseline assumptions about the power mix 
provides the relevant reference scenario for comparison with the high-fossil-fuel-price 
(HFFP) lower carbon scenario presented in the following section. In other words, this 
reference scenario serves to enable an analytical separation of impacts due to 
exogenous changes in the power mix from the HFFP impacts. As the purpose of this 
study is not to provide an exhaustive analysis of the sensitivity of Kenya’s economy to 
oil price shocks, the exposition of this reference scenario can be concise and focuses 
on key differences to the baseline scenario. 
Figure 4.15 displays the effects on domestic supply prices in 2025 relative to the 
baseline. Not surprisingly, the size orders of the sectoral price effects are highly 
correlated with the sectoral baseline energy cost (i.e. direct fossil fuel cost plus 
electricity cost) shares in total production costs: As shown in Figure 4.16, the cross-
sectoral variation in baseline energy cost shares explains nearly 98 per cent of the 
cross-sectoral variation in the price impacts. 
These price increases entail a marked growth slow-down in the most affected sectors 
(in particular mining, petrol, electricity and transport services). In macroeconomic 
terms, the simulated oil price shock is an adverse terms-of-trade shock, i.e. the 
                                                 
26 International gas prices also return to a higher level (Table 3), but in the case of Kenya assumptions 
about the gas import price matter very little as gas imports remain tiny under the maintained assumption 
that thermal generation continues to be oil-fired over the simulation horizon. 
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aggregate ratio of import prices paid by Kenya to export prices paid by the rest of the 
world for Kenya’s exports rises. Thus, Kenya must devote more domestic productive 
resources to export production at the expense of production for the home market in 
order to pay for the higher import bill. The welfare-reducing terms-of trade shock 
requires a real exchange depreciation on the order of 7.6 per cent by 2025 relative to 
the baseline. The depreciation effect discourages imports and stimulates exports. The 
sectors that expand in relation to the baseline are sectors with both low energy cost 
shares and relatively high initial export-output ratios, in particular agriculture, food 
processing, and textiles and clothing. In those sectors, the stimulating export growth 
effect due to the exchange rate depreciation dominates the output-depressing rise in 
energy costs. 
The effects on GDP growth are displayed in Figures 4.17 and 4.18. GDP growth rates 
are hit strongly initially and then recover partially as international oil prices settle at the 
new higher level and the economy adapts to the shock. By 2025, the annual growth 
rate is still about 0.7 percentage points below the baseline growth rate. The simulation 
results suggest that by 2025 the level of GDP would be some 9 per cent below base 
(Figure 4.18). 
The real income loss is reflected in a slower growth of real wages, capital returns and 
natural resource rents. Because of the marked growth slow-down in the mining sector, 
the drop in resource rents is particularly pronounced. Only the real returns to land rise 
relative to the baseline as a result of the afore-mentioned increase in agricultural 
output and exports. This effect is reinforced by the expansion of food processing 
exports, which raises the demand for agricultural output further via backward linkage 
effects. 
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Figure 4.15: Impact on Domestic Producer Prices - High Oil Price Scenario 
2025 
(Percentage deviation of price relative to unskilled wage from 2025 baseline) 
 
Figure 4.16: Correlation between Domestic Supply Price Changes and Baseline 
Energy Cost Shares 2025 – HFFP Scenario 
(dPX: Deviation of 2025 domestic supply prices from baseline in per cent) 
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Figure 4.17: Annual Growth Rate of Real GDP – Baseline and High Oil Price 
Scenario 
(in Per cent) 
 
 
Figure 4.18: Level of Real GDP 2015 to 2025 - Baseline and High Oil Price 
Scenario 
(Index 2015 = 1.0) 
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Figure 4.19: Impact on Factor Returns - High Fossil Fuel Price Scenario 
(Percentage deviation from Baseline level 2020 and 2025) 
 
 
4.5. HFFP Lower Carbon Scenario 
Since higher fossil fuel prices increase the cost advantage of geothermal vis-à-vis 
thermal power generation, the positive effect of the shift to a higher geothermal share 
on real GDP growth is noticeably stronger than in the previous lower carbon scenario 
(Figure 4.20 and Figure 4.12). The cumulative effect of the increases in annual GDP 
growth means that by 2025 GDP is 2.6 per cent higher than in the HFFP reference 
scenario. The corresponding GDP increase reported in section 4.3 for the low-oil-price 
case amounted to 1.1 per cent. 
The real exchange rate appreciation associated with the lower dependency on fossil 
fuel imports is on the order of 1.2 per cent by 2025 and thus likewise slightly more 
pronounced than the corresponding real appreciation of 0.7 per cent reported in 
section 4.3. As illustrated by Figure 4.21 for domestic producer prices, the general 
pattern of the sectoral effects is the same as in the earlier lower carbon scenario, but 
in quantitative terms the sectoral changes in output, employment and trade flows are 
again moderately stronger.  
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Figure 4.20: Annual Growth Rate of Real GDP – High Fossil Fuel Price Lower 
Carbon Scenario 
(in Per cent) 
 
 
The same conclusion applies to the impacts on the functional income distribution 
(Figure 4.22), except for the impact of the low-carbon transition on the real returns to 
agricultural land. As discussed in section 4.4, the export-output ratio of agriculture is 
higher in the HFFP reference scenario than in the baseline scenario, since Kenya 
needs to export more to pay for the higher fossil fuel import bill. Thus the stronger real 
appreciation under the HFFP low carbon scenario which slows down agricultural 
export growth has a stronger effect on agricultural output growth than in the low carbon 
scenario under low oil prices. As a result, agricultural land rents grow slightly slower 
than in the HFFP reference scenario up to 2025, whereas Figure 4.13 reports a 
reversal of the impacts on real land rents between 2020 and 2025 as discussed in 
section 4.3. 
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Figure 4.21: Impact on Domestic Producer Prices – High Fossil Fuel Price 
Lower Carbon Scenario 2025 
(Percentage deviation of price relative to unskilled wage from 2025 baseline) 
 
 
To sum up, the results of the sensitivity analysis presented here confirm the findings 
of section 4.3. A higher of share of low-cost geothermal in the power mix reduces 
electricity prices and mildly stimulates economic growth. The associated reduction in 
the fossil fuel import bill triggers a moderate real exchange rate appreciation, which 
reduces the prices of imports faced by domestic producers and households and entails 
a further economy-wide real income gain. All household groups gain, but urban and 
rural higher-income households gain relatively more than urban and rural low-income 
households, as skilled real wages and real returns to capital rise slightly more than 
unskilled wages and returns to land. Impacts on the sectoral composition of real output 
and employment are generally small. In tendency, sectors with a higher baseline share 
of electricity costs in total production cost and lower trade shares expand relative to 
sectors with a low electricity cost share and with less exposure to international trade. 
Moreover, the results in this section demonstrate that the size of the beneficial 
aggregate effects depends on the evolution of fossil fuel prices over the simulation 
horizon: Under the Lower Carbon scenario, real GDP in 2025 is about 1.1 per cent 
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scenario, real GDP in 2025 is more than 2 per cent higher than in the High Fossil Fuel 
Price scenario. 
Figure 4.22: Impact on Factor Returns – High Fossil Fuel Price Lower Carbon 
Scenario 
(Percentage deviation from High Fossil Fuel Price Scenario 2020 and 2025) 
 
 
5. Dynamic Scenario Analysis: Ghana 
5.1. Overview 
The scenario design for the Ghana study follows the same basic logic as the Kenya 
study. We consider again four dynamic scenarios up to 2025 that differ with respect to 
(i) the evolution of the power mix in on-grid electricity generation and (ii) the evolution 
of world market fossil fuel prices. Table 5.1 outlines the alternative scenario 
assumptions along these two dimensions. The specification of the lower carbon 
scenarios is again motivated by the results of the comparative LCOE analysis by 
Pueyo et al (2016 2017)  
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Table 5.1: Schematic Outline of Scenarios for Kenya 
 Baseline Power Mix Lower Carbon Power Mix 
Low Fossil Fuel 
Prices 
Baseline Scenario 
 
Rising share of Thermal 
Falling share of Hydro 
_________________________ 
 
Oil import price 50% below 2011 
level; Gas import price 55% below 
2011 level 
Lower Carbon Scenario 
 
Less steep rise of Thermal 
share 
Less steep drop of Hydro share 
__________________________ 
 
Oil import price 50% below 2011 
level; Gas import price 55% 
below 2011 level 
High Fossil Fuel 
Prices 
High Fossil Fuel Price 
Scenario 
 
Rising share of Thermal 
Falling share of Hydro 
_________________________ 
 
Oil import price 19% below 2011 
level; Gas import price 17% below 
2011 level 
Lower Carbon HFFP 
Scenario 
 
Less steep rise of Thermal 
share 
Less steep drop of Hydro share 
 
__________________________ 
 
Oil import price 19% below 2011 
level; Gas import price 17% 
below 2011 level 
 
5.2. Baseline Scenario 
The construction of the baseline scenario starts from the 2011 benchmark SAM for 
Ghana outlined in section 3. For the period up to 2015, the forward projection takes 
account of recent available data observations, while the projections from 2016 to 2025 
draw upon expert forecasts for the for the determination of the main model-exogenous 
drivers of economic growth (Table 5.2).27 
                                                 
27 The final specification of the baseline scenario benefited from clarifying discussions with S. 
Bawakyillenuo and ISSER colleagues (who also provided access to additional GLSS data) during a visit 
to Accra in December 2016.  
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5.2.1. Population and Labour Force Growth 
Population and labour force growth is based on the UN DESA (2015) medium-variant 
projections commonly used in contemporary long-run scenario studies. According to 
these projections, the total population of Ghana rises from 25.5 million in 2012 to 33.7 
million in 2025. As shown, the scenario takes into account that over this period the 
annual growth rate of the working-age population – and thus the labour force growth 
rate in the model under the assumption of a constant participation rate - remains 
considerably higher than the population growth rate.  
5.2.2. Total Factor Productivity and GDP Growth  
The time path for the annual TFP growth rate is determined indirectly by imposing a 
target growth path for Ghana’s real GDP (Table 5.2) and by calibrating the TFP 
parameter of the model dynamically to match this target growth path as further 
explained in section 4.2.2 above.  
The GDP baseline scenario growth rates up to 2014 are the reported official national 
accounts figures (GSS 2015) and the projections up to 2018 are taken from World 
Bank (2016). For the period beyond 2019 it is assumed that annual GDP continues to 
grow at rates just below the World Bank forecast for 2017/18, which is consistent with 
a plausible slightly decelerating TFP growth trend. The growth rates imply that 
aggregate GDP in 2025 is 2.68 times higher than in 2011 and per-capita GDP doubles 
over this period. 
5.2.3. Electricity Sector and Domestic Natural Gas Extraction 
The assumed evolution of the on-grid power mix in the baseline takes account of the 
Strategic National Energy Plan 2006-2020 (EnCG 2006), the Energy Sector Strategy 
and Development Plan (Ministry of Energy 2010), the Ministry of Petroleum’s Gas 
Master Plan (Republic of Ghana 2015a), the Ghana SREP (Republic of Ghana 2015b), 
and is also informed by a range of other sources including World Bank (2013), EnRC 
(2016) and IRENA (2015).  
The key assumptions for the construction of the baseline scenario are that (i) hydro 
capacity remains constant beyond 2015 up to 2025, i.e. the hydro share drops as total 
generation grows (Figure 5.3); (ii) the on-grid share of non-hydro renewables remains 
negligibly small, i.e. the binding constraints to investments in renewable energy 
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capacity in Ghana identified by Pueyo et al (2017) are not relaxed, and thus Ghana’s 
official aspirational target to reach a renewable share (excluding large-scale hydro) of 
10 per cent by 2020 is not achieved; (iii) the rising gap between hydro generation and 
total demand for electricity is entirely bridged by additional thermal generation, and 
thus the share of thermal in total generation is rising; and (iv) the share of gas in total 
thermal generation is rapidly rising from 2018 onwards. 
In line with Ghana’s Gas Master Plan and the recommendations in World Bank (2013), 
the baseline scenario assumes further that natural gas extraction from domestic 
sources develops at a fast pace, so that by the 2020s a significant fraction of the 
expanding gas demand by the power sector is covered by domestically sourced 
supplies. According to the model-generated power demand projection, around 35,000 
GWh of thermal generation would be required in 2025 under the baseline assumption 
of a constant hydro capacity. About 350 billion cubic feet (bcf) of natural gas would be 
required to generate this amount of electricity. The Gas Master Plan’s most optimistic 
‘balanced high case’ scenario projects 216 bcf for Ghana’s domestic natural gas 
production in 2025, and a ‘balanced base case’ scenario forecasts 111 bcf for the 
same year (Republic of Ghana 2015a: Tables 43 and 41). At the midpoint between 
these two supply projections about 45 per cent of the electricity sector’s natural gas 
demand could be satisfied from domestic sources by 2025. 
Technically these changes over the simulation horizon are implemented in the CGE 
model by shifts in the parameters  governing the gas import share and the share of 
natural gas output (which is virtually zero in the initial 2011 benchmark equilibrium) in 
the total output of Ghana’s oil-gas extraction sector from 2018 onwards together with 
corresponding shifts in the sector’s natural resource factor supply, and by shifts in the 
thermal electricity sector’s input-output parameters for crude oil, natural gas and 
refined petrol.28 
As in the Kenya study, the baseline scenario captures increase in household 
connectivity rates in a stylised form through gradual exogenous increases in the model 
parameters governing the shares of electricity consumption in total household 
consumption. Shifts to more electrified modes of production as the Kenyan economy 
                                                 
28 Presently, Ghana’s oil-fired thermal generation uses predominantly light crude oil (LCO). 
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develops are captured in the CGE model via gradual increases in the electricity input-
output coefficients for sectors where the 2011 GTAP electricity input-output 
coefficients are well below the average across lower middle income countries in the 
GTAP database. Again, shifts to more electrified modes of production reduce the need 
for physical labour and basic capital inputs to some extent, and so the technology 
parameters governing the demand for primary factors are gradually revised 
downwards accordingly in these sectors.  
Table 5.2: Key Features of Dynamic Baseline Scenario – Ghana 
 
Sources: GDP Growth 2012-14, GSS (2015) 2015-18, World Bank (2016); Population and labour force  
growth: UN DESA (2015), medium-variant projections. 
 
5.3. Lower Carbon Scenario 
5.3.1. Scenario Specification 
As noted in Pueyo et al (2016:16), in comparison to Kenya Ghana’s ‘renewable energy 
potential is considerably smaller except for large hydropower, (…). Hydropower 
potential has been harnessed to a large extent but substantial potential is still 
untapped and several areas have been marked as potential sites for medium and mini 
hydropower plants’. In line with Table 3.1 above, Pueyo et al (2017:29) report that 
‘(o)ur estimates of LCOE for renewable power plants show hydropower is the least 
Year GDP GDP per cap. Labor Force Population Population CrudeOil Natural Gas
% % % 1000
2012 9.3 6.8 2.58 2.47   25 545 1.01 1.02
2013 7.3 4.9 2.49 2.43   26 164 0.98 1.23
2014 4.0 1.6 2.50 2.38   26 787 0.89 1.16
2015 3.4 1.1 2.56 2.33   27 410 0.51 0.83
2016 5.9 3.6 2.32 2.27   28 033 0.50 0.64
2017 8.2 6.0 2.46 2.22   28 657 0.50 0.44
2018 8.2 6.0 2.53 2.18   29 280 0.50 0.44
2019 8.1 6.0 2.51 2.13   29 905 0.50 0.44
2020 8.0 5.9 2.45 2.09   30 530 0.50 0.44
2021 8.0 5.9 2.43 2.05   31 158 0.50 0.44
2022 8.0 6.0 2.35 2.02   31 786 0.50 0.44
2023 8.0 6.0 2.33 1.98   32 416 0.50 0.44
2024 8.0 6.1 2.38 1.95   33 046 0.50 0.44
2025 8.0 6.1 2.47 1.91   33 678 0.50 0.44
Annual Growth Rates World Market Prices
Price Index (2011 = 1)
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cost technology in Ghana, at 7.9 USc per KWh. The LCOE of generic wind power is 
14.3 USc per KWh and that of solar PV 18.7 USc per KWh’, and thus wind and solar 
are not yet cost-competitive in relation to gas-fired power plants with an estimated 
LCOE of 13 USc per KWh (Table 3.1).  
IRENA (2015: Table 8) identifies small- and medium-scale hydro power sites with an 
estimated total capacity of 837 MW and a generation potential of around 3,500 GWh. 
IRENA estimates suggest that the LCOE ‘for new small hydropower projects is 
between USD 0.03 and USD 0.115/kWh in developing countries’, which is within the 
range of the LCOE estimate used for the initial calibration of the hydro sector 
parameters in the CGE model for Ghana.29  
In line with these estimates, the stylized lower carbon scenario for Ghana considered 
here assumes a gradual linear expansion in hydro generation over the period 2018 to 
2025 such that hydro generation is about 3,500 GWh higher than in the baseline by 
2025. Thermal generation drops accordingly in relation to the baseline thermal 
expansion growth path. This means that the hydro share in total generation in 2025 is 
7 percentage-points higher than in the baseline scenario and the 2025 thermal share 
drops from 83 to 76 per cent (Figure 5.3). 
Figure 5.3: Electricity Generation Shares in Baseline and Lower Carbon 
Scenario 
  
                                                 
29 http://costing.irena.org/technology-costs/power-generation/hydropower.aspx (accessed December 
2016). 
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5.3.2. Results 
The moderate and gradual shift from thermal to hydro electricity generation entails 
modest changes in the system-wide average cost of electricity production over the 
period 2018 to 2025, and these cost reductions are by assumption fully passed on to 
electricity users. By 2025, the electricity supply price in this scenario is 1.1 per cent 
lower than in the baseline (Figure 5.8). This electricity price effect is far less 
pronounced than the corresponding price effect in the low carbon scenario for Kenya 
(Figure 4.8), because the size order of the assumed shift from thermal to low-carbon 
power is far less extreme – which reflects the fact that Ghana’s potential for an 
economically viable expansion of small- and medium-scale hydro is far more limited 
than Kenya’s potential for an expansion of low-cost geothermal according to the cited 
studies.  
The dynamic macroeconomic adjustment process in this scenario is complicated by 
the fact that the baseline hydro-thermal generation cost differential endogenously 
generated by the CGE model has a hump-shaped time profile as shown in Figure 5.5: 
Over the period 2015 the thermal generation costs drop sharply relative to hydro unit 
costs, so that by 2017 the initial cost advantage of hydro turns into cost disadvantage. 
Beyond 2017 this trend reverses as the thermal unit cost begin to rise relative to the 
hydro unit costs and beyond 2021 hydro restores its status as the least-cost electricity 
technology. 
Figure 5.5: Ratio of Average Hydro to Average Thermal Generation Cost 2015 – 
2025 
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Primarily three features of the baseline scenario drive this peculiar time path of the 
hydro / thermal cost differential. First, fossil fuel import prices and particularly gas 
prices drop strongly over the period 2015 to 2017 (Table 5.2), and entail a sharp drop 
in the thermal generation cost over this period. Second, the strong increase in demand 
for thermal electricity associated with the rise in the thermal share over the whole 
simulation horizon drives up the equilibrium rate of return to capital in the thermal 
sector – i.e. the return on investments in thermal capacity must rise in order to attract 
the new capital required for the expansion of the thermal sector. This effect raises the 
cost of capital in the thermal sector. Third, as Ghana has an initial trade deficit with the 
rest of the world and the foreign savings required to cover the trade deficit grow at a 
lower exogenous rate than Ghana’s real income and import demand, the real 
exchange rate depreciates slightly over the entire simulation interval.30 Thus, while 
fossil fuel prices remain constant beyond 2017 in foreign-currency terms, they rise 
gradually from 2018 to 2025 from the perspective of domestic firms and households 
due to the depreciation effect. The first effect dominates the time profile of the hydro / 
thermal cost differential up to 2017 while the second and third effect become jointly 
dominant after 2018. 
  
                                                 
30 Over the period 2015 to 2025, the baseline real exchange rate – here measured as aggregate import 
price relative to the domestic producer price index – rises by 5.4 per cent.  
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Figure 5.6: Impact on Domestic Producer Prices – Lower Carbon Scenario 
2025 
(Percentage deviation of price relative to unskilled wage from 2025 baseline)
 
 
It is not surprising, that the small direct electricity cost reduction effect towards 2025 
triggers only weak intersectoral spill-over effects via input-output linkages and other 
general equilibrium repercussions. As shown in Figure 5.7, the equilibrium effects on 
the supply prices of other sectors are generally tiny. The only noteworthy indirect price 
effect is the 0.8 per cent drop in the domestic natural gas supply price. This effect 
occurs since the thermal sector expands at a lower rate than in the baseline, and thus 
its demand for gas grows at a lower rate. 
For the same reason, fossil fuel imports drop relative to the baseline (Figure 5.8). As 
in the case of Kenya, the reduction in the fossil fuel import bill entails a mild real 
exchange rate appreciation effect, i.e. the additional ‘space’ in Ghana’s external 
balance-of-payments account created by the reduced fossil fuel import payments 
enables a simultaneous increase in the volume of non-fuel imports and a reduction in 
the volume of exports that must be shipped to the rest of the world in order to pay for 
imports (Figures 5.8 and 5.9). 
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Figure 5.7: Impact on Real Import Volumes by Commodity Group – Lower 
Carbon Scenario 2025 
(Percentage deviation from 2025 baseline) 
 
 
In an aggregate macroeconomic sense, the net welfare effect for Ghana associated 
with the low carbon transition scenario considered here is unambiguously positive: 
Using virtually the same total real resources as in the baseline, Ghana can 
simultaneously command a higher real volume of imports and retain a higher share of 
total domestic output as less of this output is exported than in the baseline.  
This positive welfare effect is reflected in a positive but very small increase in real 
GDP. The cumulative effect of the tiny annual growth rate increments reported in 
Figure 5.9 over the period 2021 to 2025 entails that the level of real GDP by 2025 is a 
negligible 0.025 per cent higher than in the baseline scenario. Given, the high baseline 
annual growth rate of 8 per cent, this difference is equivalent to about 1 day’s value of 
economic activity – i.e. the baseline growth path would reach the lower carbon 
scenario end-of-2025 GDP level about 1 day later. 
Part of the reason for the small GDP effect is that between 2018 and 2020 the low-
carbon transition initially raises the average price of electricity (by about 1 per cent) 
due to the hump-shaped time profile of  the hydro / thermal cost differential (Figure 
5.5) discussed above. A further reason is that the reduction in demand for domestic 
-10.0 -8.0 -6.0 -4.0 -2.0 0.0 2.0 4.0 6.0
Agriculture
CrudeOil
NatGas
OMining
ProcFood
BevTob
TexCloth
Petrol
Chemics
OLightMnf
OHeavyMnf
OServices
56 
 
natural gas by the thermal sector leads to a small reduction in the primary resource 
extraction activity of the domestic fossil fuel sector. In economic terms this means a 
reduction in the supply of a primary production factor which entails per se a negative 
effect on real GDP. However, this effect is likewise tiny: The 2025 supply of domestic 
fossil fuel primary resources drops by 1.8 per cent, while the baseline contribution of 
this factor to GDP is about 2 per cent – so the effect on real GDP is well below 0.05 
per cent. 
Figure 5.8: Impact on Real Export Volumes by Commodity Group – Lower 
Carbon Scenario 2025 
(Percentage deviation from 2025 baseline) 
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Figure 5.9: Annual Growth Rate of Real GDP – Baseline and Low Carbon 
Scenario 
(in per cent) 
 
 
Finally, Figures 5.10 and 5.11 report the effects on the functional distribution of income 
and real factor income by household type for 2020 and 2025. Unsurprisingly, the 
impacts are again tiny. Like in the case of Kenya, the distribution impact is slightly 
regressive in tendency as by 2025 capital and skilled labour gain slightly in relation to 
other factors. As explained earlier in section 4.3., this indicates that on average the 
sectors with higher growth than in the baseline tend to be more capital- and /or skill-
intensive than sectors subject to a growth decline. The drop in agricultural land returns 
relative to the baseline scenario is due to the slight growth slowdown of the agricultural 
sector as agricultural imports rise and agricultural export growth declines marginally in 
response to the real appreciation. 
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Figure 5.11: Impact on Factor Returns – Low Carbon Scenario 
(Percentage deviation of factor prices relative to CPI from baseline level 2020 and 2025) 
  
 
Figure 5.11: Impact on Real Household Income – Low Carbon Scenario 
(Percentage deviation from Baseline level 2020 and 2025)  
 
5.4. High Fossil Fuel Price Scenario 
The high fossil fuel price scenario under baseline assumptions about the power mix 
considered here provides the relevant reference scenario for comparison with the 
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In contrast to the baseline scenario, crude oil and refined petrol world prices are 
assumed to return to higher levels beyond 2016. As in the HFFP scenario for Kenya 
(section 4.3), between 2016 and 2018 oil prices rise linearly to a level that is 62 per 
cent higher than the 2018 baseline price (Table 5.2) and then remain at that higher 
level beyond 2018, i.e. the oil price index with base 2011 rises to 0.81 by 2018 
compared to 0.50 in the baseline scenario. The natural gas import price index is 
assumed to stay permanently at the 2016 baseline scenario level of 0.83, and is thus 
89 per cent higher than the corresponding baseline level (0.44) over the period 2017 
to 2025. Given that the purpose of this study is not to provide an exhaustive analysis 
of the sensitivity of Ghana’s economy to oil price shocks, the exposition of this 
reference scenario is brief and focuses on key differences to the baseline scenario. 
Figure 5.12: Impact on Domestic Producer Prices – High Fossil Fuel Price 
Scenario 2025 
(Percentage deviation of price relative to unskilled wage from 2025 baseline) 
 
 
Figure 5.12 displays the effects on domestic supply prices in 2025 relative to the 
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by 2025, the cost-push effect on the price of electricity is strong, and as a result the 
annual average growth rate of the electricity sector over the period 2015 to 2025 drops 
from 12.4 to 8.6 per cent. The supply prices of non-energy sectors with relatively high 
energy cost (direct fuel plus electricity) shares in total production costs including the 
chemical industry, heavy and light manufacturing, other mining and transport services 
are likewise pushed up significantly and the growth  of these sectors slows down 
accordingly. 
In the baseline scenario Ghana remains a marginal net fossil fuel importer despite its 
crude oil exports, and thus the rise in international fossil fuel prices is an adverse 
terms-of-trade shock for the country. However, due to the additional crude oil export 
revenue growth in the HFFP scenario, the absolute size of the annual net fossil fuel 
import bill relative to the baseline scenario becomes smaller over time, and thus 
towards 2025 Ghana needs to earn less non-fuel export revenue than in the baseline 
to pay for the net fossil fuel import bill. This is a noteworthy difference to the HFFP 
scenario for Kenya discussed in section 4.4. 
Figures 5.13 and 5.14 show the effects on GDP growth. As in the case of Kenya, GDP 
growth rates are hit strongly by the initially by the higher energy costs and then start 
to recover as international oil prices settle at the new higher level and the economy 
adapts to the shock. In contrast to Kenya, however, from 2023 onwards GDP growth 
rates start to overshoot the baseline rates. The reason for this effect is that the 
expansion of the domestic fossil fuel sector is associated with a higher rate of domestic 
natural resource extraction than in the baseline. By 2023 the impact of this increase in 
the supply of a primary production factor on total economy-wide value added is 
sufficiently strong to dominate the growth-depressing effects of higher energy prices 
on the annual growth rate. 
However, as shown in Figure 5.14, this effect is not strong enough to push the level of 
GDP above the baseline path: By 2021 real GDP is 4.0 per cent below base and by 
2025 still 3.2 per cent below base. 
Finally, for the interpretation of the results of the HFFP Lower Carbon scenario 
considered in the following section it is important to note that the hump-shaped time 
profile of the hydro-thermal cost-differential (Figure 5.5) does of course not occur in 
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the HFFP scenarios: Since fossil fuel prices remain high over the entire 2015-2025 
period, the hydro/thermal unit cost ratio remains below unity throughout. 
Figure 5.13: Annual Growth Rate of Real GDP – Baseline and High Oil Price 
Scenario 
(in Per cent) 
 
 
Figure 5.13: Level of Real GDP 2015 to 2025 - Baseline and High Oil Price 
Scenario 
(Index 2015 = 1.0) 
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5.5. HFFP Lower Carbon Scenario  
Higher fossil fuel prices increase the cost advantage of hydro vis-à-vis thermal power 
generation, and so the impact of the transition towards a higher hydro share entails a 
stronger reduction of the electricity than in the low carbon scenario of section 5.3: By 
2025 the electricity price is 6.2 per cent lower than in the HFFP reference scenario, 
whereas in the low carbon scenario with low fossil fuel prices, the electricity price 
impact is only -1.1 per cent. 
Moreover, since in contrast to the previous low carbon scenario the hydro cost 
advantage now prevails over the entire 2018-25 period, the gradual downward shift in 
electricity prices begins right at the start of the transition process in 2018, whereas in 
the low carbon scenario with low fossil fuel prices the same transition entails an initial 
electricity price increase due to the hump-shaped time profile of the hydro-thermal cost 
differential (Figure 5.5). Correspondingly, the initial impact on the growth rate of real 
GDP turns from marginally negative (-0.01 percentage points in 2018, Figure 5.9) in 
the low carbon scenario to marginally positive (+0.03 percentage points in 2018, 
Figure 5.15).  
Figure 5.14: Annual Growth Rate of Real GDP – High Fossil Fuel Price Lower 
Carbon Scenario 
(in per cent) 
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However, the reduction in demand for domestic natural gas by the thermal sector and 
the real appreciation effect due to the reduced net fossil fuel import bill discussed in 
section 5.3 again lead to a small reduction in the primary resource extraction activity 
of the domestic fossil fuel sector. As explained earlier, this effect entails per se a 
negative impact on real GDP. By 2022 this effect begins to slightly dominate the 
growth-enhancing effect of lower electricity prices (Figure 5.15). The cumulative 
impact of these miniscule effects on annual GDP growth rates remains small: By 2020, 
the level of real GDP in the HFFP low carbon scenario is 0.06 per cent higher and by 
2020 0.11 per cent lower than in the HFFP reference scenario. 
Thus, in contrast to the corresponding analysis for Kenya, the quantitative impact of 
the lower-carbon transition in the electricity sector on macroeconomic growth in Ghana 
is not particularly sensitive to variations in the assumptions about international fossil 
fuel prices: Both, in the low carbon scenario and the HFFP low carbon scenario the 
impacts on real GDP remain negligibly small despite the qualitative differences across 
the two scenarios. Also in contrast to the findings for Kenya, higher fossil fuel prices 
do not enlarge but rather reduce the beneficial impacts of a transition from thermal to 
lower-cost renewable electricity generation in the case of Ghana. As elaborated 
above, the main reason for these differences is related to the endogenous changes in 
domestic fossil fuel resource extraction that occur in the case of Ghana but not in the 
case of Kenya. 
Figure 5.15: Impact on Factor Returns – Low Carbon Scenario 
(Percentage deviation of factor prices relative to CPI from baseline level 2020 and 2025) 
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As shown in Figure 5.16, impacts on the functional distribution of income remain small. 
As in the lower carbon scenario of section 3, the drop in returns to land relative to the 
reference scenario is due to a slight decline of the growth rate of the agricultural sector 
as a result of the real exchange rate appreciation effect: The 2025 gross output this 
sector is 0.37 per cent lower than in the reference scenario, which is equivalent to a 
drop in the average annual growth rate over the period 2015-2025 on the order of -
0.04 percentage point. The slight drop in average real returns to capital by 2025 
relative to the reference scenario is primarily driven by the slower growth of the 
relatively capital-intensive fossil fuel extraction section. In the HFFP reference 
scenario this sector is larger than in the baseline scenario and thus its growth slow-
down has a stronger adverse effect on capital returns and natural resource rents in 
the HFFP low carbon scenario than in the low carbon scenario of section 5.3. 
6. Conclusions 
The present study applies purpose-built dynamic computable general equilibrium 
models for Ghana and Kenya with a disaggregated country-specific representation of 
the power sector to simulate the prospective medium-run growth and distributional 
implications associated with a shift towards a higher share of renewables in the power 
mix up to 2025. 
In both countries the share of fossil-fuel-based thermal electricity generation in the 
power mix will increase sharply over the next decade and beyond according to current 
national energy sector development plans. 
Kenya has a considerable potential for a further expansion of geothermal electricity 
generation and existing estimates suggest a significant cost advantage of geothermal 
over thermal power generation. In line with this assessment, the simulation analysis 
for Kenya considers a stylised low-carbon transition scenario in which the geothermal 
share in total domestic on-grid electricity generation increases along a steep linear 
schedule to reach 75 per cent in 2025, so that the 2025 geothermal share is about 24 
percentage points higher than in the baseline scenario. 
The higher of share of low-cost geothermal in the power mix reduces electricity prices 
and mildly stimulates economic growth. The associated reduction in the fossil fuel 
import bill triggers a moderate real exchange rate appreciation, which reduces the 
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prices of imports faced by domestic producers and households and entails a further 
economy-wide real income gain. The size of these beneficial aggregate effects 
depends on the evolution of international fossil fuel prices over the simulation horizon: 
Under a low-carbon transition scenario with low world market fossil fuel prices, real 
GDP in 2025 is about 1.1 per cent higher than in the baseline scenario. In a low-carbon 
scenario with high fossil fuel import price scenario, real GDP in 2025 is more than 2 
per cent higher than in the corresponding high-fossil-fuel-price baseline scenario. All 
household groups gain, but urban and rural higher-income households gain relatively 
more than urban and rural low-income households, because skilled real wages and 
real returns to capital rise slightly more than unskilled wages and returns to land. 
Impacts on the sectoral structure of production are generally small. In tendency, 
sectors with a higher baseline share of electricity costs in total production cost expand 
relative to sectors with a low electricity cost share. 
In comparison to Kenya, Ghana’s potential for an economically viable expansion of 
renewable on-grid power generation is considerably smaller. Moreover, in contrast to 
Kenya Ghana has an already active domestic fossil fuel extraction sector and is 
planning to satisfy a significant share of the fuel demand of its expanding gas-fired 
thermal generation using domestic natural gas resources. The available levelised cost 
estimates suggest that in the case of Ghana presently hydro is the only renewable 
energy option with a clear cost advantage over gas-fired thermal generation, yet the 
potential for a further expansion of hydro capacity is limited. In line with this 
assessment, the simulation analysis for Ghana considers a moderate lower-carbon 
transition scenario in which the hydro share in total generation by 2025 is 7 
percentage-points higher than in the baseline scenario and the 2025 thermal share 
drops from 83 to 76 per cent. 
This moderate electricity sector transition shock generates only marginal impacts on 
macroeconomic growth: The effect on real GDP in 2025 ranges from +0.2 per cent 
under low world market fossil fuel prices to -0.1 per cent under high international fossil 
fuel prices. The presence of a domestic fossil fuel extraction sector in Ghana changes 
the qualitative nature of the dynamic adjustment to the transition shock in relation to 
the case of Kenya. As in the analysis for Kenya, the partial shift to lower-cost 
renewable power generation reduces the cost electricity and this per se stimulates 
economic growth. However, the associated drop in demand for domestic natural gas 
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by the electricity sector slightly dampens the growth of domestic natural resource 
extraction, and this reduction in primary factor supply growth per se reduces real GDP 
growth. Thus, in the case of Ghana these two effects drag GDP in opposite directions 
and the net effect is miniscule. Similar to Kenya, the impacts on the sectoral structure 
of domestic production are small and thus the effects on relative factor prices that 
determine the functional income distribution remain unremarkable. 
The overarching general message suggested by the simulation results presented here 
is that in both countries it appears feasible to reduce the carbon content of electricity 
generation significantly without adverse consequences for economic growth and 
without noteworthy distributional effects. 
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